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Poverty Measures and Anti-Poverty Policy 
François BOURGUIGNON 
DELTA, Paris 
and Gary S. FIELDS* 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 
1 Introduction 
Amartya Sen has made fundamental contributions to the study 
of distributional aspects of economic growth and decline. Among his 
pathbreaking works are his lectures on the economics of inequality 
(Sen, 1973), his article on the axiomatics of poverty measurement (Sen, 
1976), and his book on anti-poverty policy in the context of famines 
(Sen, 198 1)1. 
This paper is concerned with one of these areas, namely, the mea- 
surement of poverty and the implications for anti-poverty policy. In the 
1960's and 1970's those who were working in the poverty field held a 
number of somewhat incompletely articulated views as to the extent of 
poverty in an economy. One was the judgment that a country is poorer 
the larger is the number or fraction of its people below an agreed-upon 
poverty standard. Second, the severity of poverty depends on how poor 
the poor are. As formulated then, the larger is the average income 
shortfall among the poor, the more severe is poverty. Thirdly, it was 
recognized that some of the poor are poorer than others, and the extent 
of poverty should also depend on the distribution of income among the 
poor. 
In a justly-celebrated paper, Sen (1976) made two enduring con- 
tributions to poverty analysis. The first was to show that these three 
considerations could be combined into a single poverty measure 
S = H[I + (1-I)G' (1) 
where S is the Sen poverty measure, H is the headcount ratio (i.e., the 
fraction of the population with incomes below an agreed-upon poverty 
* We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments. 
Some of his astonishingly prolific output is collected in two volumes (Sen, 
1982 and 1984). 
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line z), I is the average income shortfall among the poor (i.e., the 
average amount by which their incomes fall below the poverty line, 
expressed as a percentage of the poverty line itself), and G is the Gini 
coefficient of income inequality among the poor. Sen's other contribu- 
tion in that same paper was to show that the particular components 
of the poverty measure (H , /, and G) and the particular functional 
form used to combine them (eq. 1) are not arbitrary but may instead 
be derived from fundamental axiomatic judgments. 
Sen's approach to the measurement of poverty spawned a large 
literature in the 1970's and the 1980's. One group of researchers has 
generalized the Sen index and analyzed the properties of the extended 
class (Anand, 1977; Thon, 1979; Kakwani, 1980 and Blackorby and 
Donaldson, 1980). Another group of researchers has modified Sen's 
ideas and constructed and developed a related but distinct class of 
measures, known as the Pa class (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984). 
For the policy-maker, the availability of several poverty measures 
poses a practical problem. Supposing that he were inclined to use 
an anti-poverty budget to minimize poverty, how should he spend it? 
Would the optimal allocation of the anti-poverty budget depend upon 
whether the poverty measure to be minimized is H , / , 5 , or Pa ? If 
the preferred allocation is sensitive to the choice of poverty measure, 
and we show in this paper that it is, then policy-makers (and those who 
advise them) must first decide what particular poverty measure they 
are seeking to minimize. Then and only then will they be in a position 
to evaluate the effects on poverty of alternative resource allocations. 
In this paper, we derive two fundamental results regarding the 
Sen poverty index and its variants2 . First, we show that although the 
Sen index is decisive in any particular set of circumstances (meaning 
that it can always be used to decide how best to allocate a given anti- 
poverty budget) the main feature of the poverty-minimizing allocation 
varies from one circumstance to another. Sometimes the optimal al- 
location is to spend all the money to raise the incomes of the poorest 
of the poor, other times it is best to use all the money to lift as many 
people out of poverty as possible, and other times a mixture of these 
two policies is best. Second, we show that although the Sen index 
is decisive, the answer it gives on how best to spend an anti-poverty 
budget does not always accord with the answer given by other poverty 
measures. From this point of view, the choice of a poverty measure, 
2 From the point of view taken in this paper, the variants of the Sen index 
available in the literature have the same properties as the Sen index itself. 
Even when not explicitly mentioned, all the results given for the latter also 
apply to the former. 
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or, equivalently, of the social judgement axioms behind it, is indeed 
consequential. The last section of the paper shows that the apparently 
innocuous 'normalization axiom' imposed by Sen is responsible for the 
divergence between Sen's measure - and its variants - and the Pa 
class, and implicitly departs from the conventional utilitarian approach 
to income inequality and poverty measurement. 
2 Poverty Measures and the Optimal Anti-Poverty 
Budget Allocation Problem 
Suppose a policy-maker has available a budget of Τ for use in 
reducing poverty. We assume that the finances for this budget have 
already been raised by a process which need not concern those who 
decide how to spend the available money. 
A dollar amount ζ defines how many of the η persons in the 
economy are poor. Let q be the number of poor and let (2/1, 2/2, · · · , 2Α? ) 
be the income distribution among them. Without loss of generality, we 
index them 
yi < í/2 < · · · < % 
With the poverty line z(> yq), a poverty measure is defined as a func- 
tion 
P(q', 2/1,2/2,.,^) 
The optimal allocation policy corresponding to a poverty measure 
Ρ is then given by the following program : 
minP(<2; yx + tuy2 + *2, · · 1 VQ + tQ) 
subject to 
(P) J U>0 Vi=l,2,...,î 
i 
Vi+U > ζ Vi = (2+1,..., g 
That formulation makes it clear that any anti-poverty budget allocation 
involves a drop in the number of poor (Q is necessarily below or equal 
to q ) and/or an increase in the income of those who remain poor. This 
feature is of central concern in the present paper. 
Note that all transfers in program (P) are required to be non- 
negative. In other words, we assume that the anti-poverty budget is 
financed either by foreign aid or by taxation and that the only concern 
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of the policy-maker is about how to spend it. In the case where it 
was raised through taxation, such negative transfers may be implicitly 
accounted for by considering that (yi , y2> · · · , y?) are post-tax incomes. 
Note also that program (P) is based on the assumption that 
poverty targeting is perfect in the sense that policy-makers may trans- 
fer any amount of income to any specific individual in the population 
of poor. Prom that point of view, the present analysis departs from the 
related literature on imperfect targeting (see Kanbur, 1987) 3. 
The simplest measures of poverty are the headcount ratio 
η 
and the average relative income shortfall : 
1- z~y<i = " 1 y" z~yi = " I '^a z «L· z « έΐ ζ 
where 0, is the absolute shortfall of the ith individual. Both measures 
Η and I may be combined into the poverty gap, HI. This measure 
represents the fraction of the poverty line, ζ , that would have to be 
spent per head of the (whole) population to eliminate poverty. 
The Sen measure combines H, I, and G (the Gini coefficient 
associated with the (yi , 2/2, · , y?) distribution) to obtain :
S = H[I + (1 - I)G'. 
Another set of measures is that proposed by Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984). In a discrete setting it simply writes: 
p _^ (*-»)* 
»■=i 
where α is a positive coefficient. 
For a larger than one the F GT measure may be interpreted as the 
sum of the individual relative poverty shortfalls, çí/z weighted by a 
function describing normatively the intensity of poverty ((z-y,)/*)0""*1 . 
The measures H and HI are special cases of the Sen and Pa 
measures. It may easily be checked that Po = H and P' = HI. One 
also sees that HI corresponds to the Sen index in the case of zero 
income inequality among the poor (i.e., y ι = y2 = · · = yq ). 
3 Although the issues dealt with here are of obvious relevance for the imperfect 
targeting case. 
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3 Optimal Anti-Poverty Allocation with H, HI 
and Pa 
Interestingly enough, the solution of program (Ρ) yields radically 
different results depending on what poverty measure is used. At one 
extreme, stands the headcount ratio Η , and the Pa measures with 
a < 1 . For these measures, the optimal allocation policy consists of 
transfering Τ to the richest persons among the poor, so as to have as 
few people as possible remaining in poverty. Accordingly the optimal 
allocation policy is given by : 
U = ζ -yi i = Q+ l,...,g 
tQ = Τ- Σ (*- Vi) 
U = 0 i = 1,2,...,Q- 1 
with Q the optimal number of poor being given by: 
5>-*·)<Γ< ]T (z-jh) (2) 
Note, moreover, that the positive transfer equirement prevents some 
additional redistribution from the poorest among the poor to the re- 
maining richest ones. Such a transfer, if it took place, would reduce 
the headcount ratio, Η , even more. As for the Pa measure, with α < 1 , 
it is a concave decreasing function of individual incomes. It follows that 
total poverty is more sensitive to a dollar given to the least poor than 
to somebody lower in the poverty scale. 
We shall term the type of anti-poverty policy that transfers all of 
the available budget to the richest of the poor a "Type-r policy". Plot- 
ting post-transfer against pre- transfer incomes as in Figure 1 yields a 
very characteristic schedule : the 45° line up to some income level and 
then a horizontal segment. Note, on the other hand, that this shape 
does not depend on the initial distribution of incomes or the budget to 
be allocated. Both these variables only determine the critical level of 
income above which transfers are positive - condition (2) above. 
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φ 
8 / 
§ / 
' / 
1 / I / 
'A45°  ^ 
2 Pre-transfer income 
Figure 1 
Optimal transfers with ff or Ρα (α < 1) 
We have thus shown :
Proposition 1. For the headcount index Η or for the Pa class with 
a < 1, the optimal allocation of an anti-poverty budget is a Type-r 
allocation. 
The "Type-p olicy" does the opposite. Only the poorest of the poor 
receive a transfer, which brings them all up to the same income level, 
still below the poverty line (see Figure 2). 
It may be shown that a Type-p policy is optimal for the PQ mea- 
sure for all a strictly larger than unity. The reason is that Pa now is 
a decreasing convex function of individual incomes more sensitive to 
transfers at the bottom than at the top of the distribution. With budget 
T, the optimal allocation will then be given by: 
U = y* -y% ' = 1,2,..., ρ 
U - 0 / = p+l,...,g 
with y* and ρ given by : 
Ϊ>ρ - W) < Í>* - Ν) = T < Í>^ - Κ)· (3) 
»=1 i=l t = l 
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φ . 
φ / 'S / ι - x 
X45°  . 
z Pre-transfer income 
Figure 2 
Optimal transfers with Pa (a > 1) 
This shows :
Proposition 2. For the PQ class with a > 1, the optimal allocation of 
an anti-poverty budget is a Type-p allocation4. 
For the 'poverty-gap' index HI, the optimal policy is indetermi- 
nate. Define a "poverty-efficient allocation" of an anti-poverty budget 
to be one where all transfers are made to persons who ex ante were 
poor and, for all persons i , the amount of the transfer U ζ ζ - y, . In 
other words, when a poverty-efficient allocation is made, no money is 
"wasted" on persons with incomes above the poverty line. From the 
definition of H and /, it may be checked that the poverty gap depends 
on the total income of those below the poverty lines and not on their 
number as such. It then follows : 
Proposition 3. HI is reduced by the same amount for all poverty- 
efficient allocations. 
4 Clearly, a Type-p allocation is also optimal for the average relative shortfall 
measure (/). However, it results in the same reduction in poverty as any 
other allocation that maintains the number of poor constant. 
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Proposition 3 has two consequences. First, it suggests that the ag- 
gregate poverty gap measure HI offers no guidance on how to allocate 
an anti-poverty budget: as long as no poor person receives a transfer 
that would put him more than above the poverty line, any allocation of 
the budget - whether Type-r, Type-p, or mixed - will lead to exactly 
the same amount of reduction in poverty by the HI measure. Sec- 
ond, HI is a component of the Sen index and of other possible poverty 
measures. The fact that this component changes by equal amounts for 
all poverty-efficient allocations implies that in determining the opti- 
mal anti-poverty allocation, we need only direct our attention at the 
remaining components - in the case of the Sen index, for example, 
only at H(l-I)G. 
4 Optimal Anti-Poverty Policy with the Sen Index 
We have distinguished three possible allocations of an anti-poverty 
budget: 
♦ Type-r: Allocate all the money to the richest of the poor, thereby 
reducing the headcount ratio the most. 
♦ iype-ρ : Allocate all the money to the poorest of the poor, thereby 
reducing the average income shortfall and the Gini coefficient 
among the poor the most. 
♦ Mixed allocation : Allocate a (strictly positive) fraction of the 
money to the richest of the poor and another (strictly positive) 
fraction of the money to the poorest of the poor. 
In this section, we show that all three types of allocation may 
be optimal when the poverty measure being used is the Sen index (or 
known generalizations of it). 
The Sen index is given by 
5 = iï[/ + (l-/)GJ. 
The presence of G in this formula makes it difficult todetermine an- 
alytically how the extent of poverty varies with the allocation of the 
anti-poverty budget. The various possibilities are more easily demon- 
strated using special cases 
Example One 
Consider first he case in which qi of the persons below the poverty 
line (z) have incomes y' and the remaining q2 of the poor have incomes 
t/2 . Assume yi < 2/2 < y ζ and let q' + ?2 = q . Normalize the total 
population η so that η = 1 . We shall now show :
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Proposition 4. In the , two-income case, the optimal allocation of the 
anti-poverty budget using the Sen index is a pure allocation, either 
Type-r or Type-p. A mixed allocation is never optimal. 
Proof: For a population with two incomes yi and y2 with corresponding 
frequencies /i and f2 , the Gini coefficient is given by 
G= _fi fiVi 
/1 + /2 hy' + hy2 
Applying this to the case of two-incomes within the poverty group and 
substituting into the formula for the Sen index, we obtain 
91+92 z 
Suppose the anti-poverty budget is %T . This budget may be ex- 
pressed in units of p, i.e., the number of people (in group 2) who could 
be lifted out of poverty. Thus, Τ = (z-y2)p. It is assumed that ρ < 92 5 . 
Let the number who actually are lifted out of poverty by a particular 
budgetary allocation be denoted by i. Then, the value of the Sen index 
is S = HI + Y(i), where 
'9i + 92 - V ζ L V 9i J 1 
We have shown that HI is reduced by the same amount for any effi- 
cient allocation (See Proposition 3). The problem therefore comes down 
to reducing Y(i) the most by choice of i : 
Ty<= [ϊ5Γ+^ί] [«<»-*>-<--»><*-·■>]· (4) 
A plot of the components of YJ is shown in Figure 3 for alternative 
choices of i . The first bracketed term yields a downward- sloping curve 
(C) which begins positive and turns negative at i - q2. By assumption, 
q2 > P, and since i < p, it follows that only part of the positive portion 
is relevant. The second bracketed term is an upward-sloping straight 
line (L), the intercept of which may be positive, zero, or negative as 
{91(2/2 - 2/1) ~ (z - y2)p} 5 0. 
5 If ρ were larger than q2 , the only issue would be whether to allocate the 
first q2 unit of the budget to the richest (group 2) or the poorest of the poor 
(group 1), the allocation of the remaining (p - q2 ) units being trivial. 
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^ (L) 
^^^ ' 
(C) 
Figure 3 
Analysis of the graph yields the following results: 
i) If {qi(y2 - yi) - (z - y2)p} < 0 the optimal number to lift out 
of poverty, i* , is zero. In this case, the largest possible poverty 
reduction is found by choosing i so that the first bracketed term 
in (4) is the most negative and the second the most positive. 
This occurs when i* - 0 . 
ii) In the case where {q' (y2 -yi)-(z-y2)p) ^ 0,it is shown in the 
appendix that Y(i) is a convex function of i so that the optimal 
policy is always Γ = 0 or i* = p. 
Type-r and type-p allocations are thus the only optimal alloca- 
tions6. □ 
As could be expected, the preceding conditions - and those re- 
ported in the appendix - show that the optimal allocation will be of 
6 Note that this is true only if the anti -poverty budget happens to be an integer 
multiple of (z - y2) . If it is not the case, the optimal policy may consist of 
lifting at the poverty line as many individuals from group 2>as possible 
and allocating the remaining budget to group 1. We ignore here this infra- 
marginal allocation problem. 
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Type-p or Type-r depending on how close are the richest poor to the 
poverty line - i.e., (z - y2) - , the initial inequality among the poor 
(which depends on (t/2 - 2/1) and q' ) and the size of the budget (p). 
In view of this result, we might ask whether a mixed allocation is 
ever optimal using the Sen index. The following example shows that it 
is. 
Example Two 
Consider a population of 100 people, 10 of whom are poor (q = 10) 
using a poverty line ζ of $20. Let the initial distribution of income 
among the poor be 
Yo = 0.1, 10, 10, 107 10, 10, 10, 10, 10 , 19.9 , 
8 
for which the corresponding Sen index is S = .0589, and suppose that 
the anti-poverty budget Τ is $10.1 - an amount just sufficient tolift 
two people out of poverty if used in that way. The question is whether 
such an allocation is optimal. 
The resultant income distributions for these ten people under the 
three possible allocations - Type-p, Type-r, and mixed - are: 
Policy New Income Distribution Sen Index 
Type-p I 10.02.,.,, 10. 02, 19. 9 1 .0494 
9 
Type-r 0.1, 10,. .., 10,20,20 .0493 
L ~* J 
7 
Mixed I 10.01...., 10. 01, 20 1 .0450 
9 
The mixed allocation is the poverty-minimizing one. 
We have thus proved : 
Proposition 5. Using the Sen index, the optimal allocation may be a 
mixed allocation. 
The intuition of Example Two is instructive. Because the richest 
poor person was just $0.1 away from the poverty line, and the Sen index 
gives credit o reducing the headcount ratio Η , it would seem that some 
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part of the anti-poverty budget should go to getting that person out of 
poverty. But getting the next person out of poverty would be more 
expensive - in this example, it would use up the entire remaining 
budget. If the rest of the budget were instead to be used to raise the 
income of the poorest of the poor, the average income shortfall would be 
reduced, as would the Gini coefficient among the poor. This latter use 
of resources might therefore duce poverty more than would further 
reduction in the headcount. 
The preceding considerations suggest that a mixed allocation is 
apt to be optimal when some of the poor are close to the poverty line, 
when the budgetary cost of reducing the headcount increases suffi- 
ciently rapidly, and when the poorest of the poor are very poor. We 
have not been able to prove this conjecture in general (indeed, it may 
not be provable in general) but we have been able to show its validity 
for an example using the uniform distribution. 
Example Three 
In this example, we assume that the distribution fpoor incomes 
on the interval [0,z] is uniform, with density 1/z. A combination of 
Type-r/Type-p policy leads to the poorest incomes being raised to the 
income level a, and all individuals with initial income larger than 6 
being lifted out of poverty. Tr and Tp , being the corresponding trans- 
fers (per head of the original population of poor), the income limits a 
and b are given by : 
a = y/2zTPi b= z- y/2zTr. 
Using the uniform distribution, it is easily shown that the Gini coeffi- 
cient among the remaining poor is given by: 
63-3α2ό + 2α3 
3ft(a2 + 62) 
and the Sen index by : 
where (a2 + 62)/26 is the mean income of the remaining poor. 
Minimizing S(a,b) under the constraint Tr + Tp = T, yields the 
optimal allocation Tr/T depicted in Figure 4 as a function of the total 
transfer T. It may be checked that the optimal policy is of Type-r only 
if the amount of the transfer is small enough. As in the preceding 
example, lifting those people infinitely close to the poverty line out of 
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poverty costs little and is the best to be done when the total budget is 
limited. For larger budgets, however, it becomes more and more costly 
to lift more people out of poverty, and this policy is less advantageous 
than raising the income of the remaining poor. Accordingly, the share of 
Type-r transfer as a fraction of the total transfer decreases continuously 
until all remaining poor have the same income (a = 6). At that stage, 
the marginal budgetary amounts are equally distributed between the 
two types of transfer. 
90 - ' 
^^""^•-^Sen Index 
20-]  1  ,  ,  ,  
0 20 40 
Total Transfer / Total Poor Income 
Figure 4 
Optimal transfer allocation (Tr/T) (Uniform distribution) 
In sum, we have shown that the Sen index can give different an- 
swers on how to allocate an anti-poverty budget. A Type-r allocation 
is optimal in some circumstances, a Type-p allocation in others, and a 
mixed allocation in others. In this respect, the Sen index is fundamen- 
tally unlike H or PQ with a < 1 or Pa with a > 1 which necessarily 
lead to corner solutions where the optimal policy is Type-p or Type-r 
only, whatever the initial distribution of poor incomes. Only for the 
Sen index (and related poverty measures) are both kinds of pure allo- 
cations ever optimal, and only for the Sen index is a mixed allocation 
ever optimal, depending on the actual distribution of incomes among 
the poor, and the size of the anti-poverty budget. 
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5 Axiomatics of Alternative Poverty Measures 
It is clear from the preceding arguments that the main difference 
between the Sen Index (and its variants) and the Pa class (for a > 1 ) 
is that the former are essentially based on the poverty gap ratio HI 
where both the headcount and the average income shortfall enter sym- 
metrically, whereas the latter give more weight to the income shortfall. 
Fora = 2, for instance, Foster et al. (1984) mention that the Pa mea- 
sure is 
P2 = H(l2 + (l-I)2C2p) 
where Cp is the coefficient of variation of the incomes of the poor. Con- 
ceptually, that definition is formally equivalent to that of Sen, except 
for the fact that the shortfall component has been squared and the co- 
efficient of variation rather than the Gini coefficient is used to measure 
inequality among the poor. 
Some of the axioms leading to the Sen index are substantive while 
some others may be considered as ad hoc. This seems to be the case 
for the Normalization Axiom (N-axiom) which postulates that, in the 
absence of inequality among the poor, poverty should be measured by 
the poverty gap HI . It is precisely this axiom which leads to an optimal 
anti-poverty policy that combines Type-r and Type-p transfers under 
certain conditions. 
The HI formulation has a number of desirable features : it is 
increasing in both H and / ; a given change in H contributes more to 
a change in poverty the larger is / ; a given change in / contributes 
more to a change in poverty the larger is H ; and when no one is in 
poverty, the poverty index has the value zero. But these same features 
would be satisfied by a wide range of other functions - for instance, 
H I2 , which is the Pa index in the case a = 2 when all the poor have 
the same income. 
A possible justification of the N-axiom, not given by Sen, relies 
on social welfare dominance considerations. Considering the whole in- 
come distribution, rather than only that part below the poverty line, 
Atkinson (1970) has shown that the (utilitarian) social welfare asso- 
ciated with distribution /(.) - /(.) being the density function - is 
larger than that associated with /*(.) for all increasing and concave 
individual utility functions if and only if: 
Γ (u - x) f(x)dx ζ fU(u-x)f*(x)dx (D) Jo Jo 
for all values of u. As noted by Foster and Shorrocks (1988a, 1988b), 
this is equivalent to saying that the poverty gap (HI) corresponding to 
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the first distribution is smaller than that corresponding to the second 
for all poverty lines u . 
Now consider two distributions uch that all individuals below a 
well-defined poverty line, z, have identical incomes. So, all poor have 
the income y in distribution /(.) and their share in the population is 
F(z), whereas the common income is y* with distribution /*(.) and 
the headcount ratio is F*(z). If y < y* , distribution /(.) cannot dom- 
inate distribution /*(.) according to the dominance criterion (D). On 
the other hand, if y > y* and F(z) < F*(z), then (D) is necessarily 
satisfied for all u < ζ . It thus remains to analyze the ambiguous case 
y > y* and F (ζ) > F* (z), i.e. there are more poor with /(.) than with 
/*(.) but they are less poor. Applying the dominance criterion (D) on 
the interval [0, z] shows that it is equivalent to: 
HI < H*I*. 
So, measuring poverty with the poverty gap /// is equivalent to using a 
dominance criterion for that part of the distributions below the poverty 
line7, provided that there is no inequality among the poor. 
Allowing now for inequality among the poor, we might follow var- 
ious possible routes. The first one is simply to add a corrective term to 
the poverty gap ratio. Generalizing Sen's approach, poverty may then 
be defined by : 
P=HI(1 + DP) 
where Dp is some inequality measure of incomes among the poor8. 
A second route is to ignore the N-axiom, and, possibly, to stick 
to the dominance criterion. Although they did not state it explicitly, 
this is precisely what Foster et al. (1984) have done. Indeed Type-p 
allocations, which are optimal for PQ measures with a > 1 , dominate 
all other allocations in the sense of the dominance criterion (D). 
Different normalization rules give a quite different radeoff be- 
tween a reduction in H and a reduction in / than does the Sen index. 
In this sense, the N-axiom is more than just a normalization axiom: it 
is consequential for a number of purposes, among which is the optimal 
allocation of an anti-poverty budget, the problem we have addressed 
here. 
7 This argument is in the line of the approach to poverty taken in Atkinson 
(1987). 
8 This is the generalization of Sen index proposed by Blackorby and Donaldson 
(1980). 
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6 Conclusion 
Here, then, is the essential difference. The Sen index gives a 
higher weight to a reduction in the poverty headcount ratio than does 
the PQ class. When a person ε below the poverty line is removed from 
poverty, the Sen index values that reduction as the average income 
shortfall adjusted for the extent of inequality among the poor. The PQ 
class, a > 1 , gives that same change a much smaller weight : the Pa 
index changes by εα , which is necessarily smaller than the average 
income shortfall. In the limit, as ε - ► 0, the change in Pa goes to zero, 
whereas the change in the Sen index remains finite. 
These differences among the various classes of measures must 
themselves be axiomatized, precisely in the spirit of Sen's approach to 
poverty measurement. It is clear, in particular, that Pa measures are 
very much like standard (utilitarian) social welfare functions limited 
to the poor segment of a given population. As such they do not give 
any particular weight to a transfer which permits omebody to be lifted 
out of poverty. In contrast, there is an implicit non-zero social gain in 
moving an individual out of poverty in Sen's measure, however close 
he may be to the poverty line. That social gain and how it compares 
with an ordinary increase in income need further axiomatic elabora- 
tion, possibly in some of the directions mentioned by Sen himself in 
his discussion of the concept of welfare. 
Following the argument in this paper, an alternative approach to 
the axiomatics of poverty would be to start from assumptions about 
the optimal allocation of an anti-poverty budget. Usual measures all 
lead to optimal allocations of type-p, type-r or mixed. But one may 
consider that another type of allocation should be optimal in some cir- 
cumstances. For instance, the budget Τ could be optimally transferred 
to everyone proportionally to his/her poverty shortfall (z - t/,·). The 
problem would then be to characterize all poverty measures consistent 
with such optimal allocations and some other basic axioms. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix derives the optimal allocation with the Sen index where 
there are two incomes among the poor and 
5fi(î/2-yi) ~(z-y2)p> 0 
Take the logarithmic derivative of Y(i) in (4) with respect to i : 
1 " di Y 
Ignoring j , since the analysis does not depend on it, we derive 
y. =  <Zl  +  Z-V2  
(«2 - i)(qi + Q2 - i) 9i (2/2 - y' ) - (z - V2)p + (z - y2)i 
The absolute value of the first term is an upward-sloping function (F' ) of i, 
and the second term is a downward-sloping function (F2) of i. 
ν y (Fl) 
no ^  ! - - ^ ^^ ; 
Qi  ^ 
Figure A 
Suppose the first term ( F' ) is^ smaller than the second ( F2 ) at i - 0 . 
Then, the graph is as in Figure A. Yi is positive to the left of the intersection 
point Ε and negative to the right of it, producing an interior maximum for 
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Y(i). Given that the goal is to minimize poverty, this means to go to the 
corners. Tb know whether i* = 0 or Γ = ρ, compare Y(0) with Y(p) and 
choose the smaller. In the case illustrated, t* = 0 
If the first term (i' ) in Yj· is larger in absolute value than the second 
(F2) at i = 0, then y is a decreasing function of i over the intervall [0,p]. 
So Y is minimized at i = p. 
Putting together the previous conditions, it is easily shown that the op- 
timal allocation is i* = ρ iff 
g> (2/2 - yi) - (z - yi)p > (g2-p)gi(ifc-yi) 
q' + 92 Q2(qi + 02 - p) 
and t* = 0 otherwise. 
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